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RESPONSES
Property: A Special Right
Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund*
I. INTRODUCrION
In Property as the Keystone Right?,' Professor Carol Rose examines the
claim that the protection of property is an important-indeed, the most
important-right conferred by our constitutional order.2 Although the
equality of property rights with other constitutionally protected rights occa-
sionally has been questioned,3 such instances are far outweighed by in-
stances of rhetorical insistence upon the bedrock nature of individual
property rights for our constitutional and democratic order.4 With the re-
cent collapse of statist economies in other parts of the world, and the at-
tempted transformation of those economies into market-driven, capitalist
systems, the American idea of constitutional protection of individual prop-
erty rights has been exported along with other ideas believed to be funda-
mental to the creation and maintenance of a liberal democratic order. As
one prominent commentator recently wrote, "[t] he right kind of constitu-
tion could play an important role in fueling economic development and
democratic reform; indeed, under current conditions, it may be indispen-
sable to them."5 Central to that "right kind of constitution" is the protec-
tion of property rights, which "creates the kind of security that is
indispensable to genuine citizenship in a democracy."6
In her article, Professor Rose questions whether property deserves this
exalted place in our constitutional ordering. She examines, with great fa-
cility and biting analysis, all of the reasons traditionally advanced for the
entrenched place of constitutional protection for individual property
rights. The arguments that she examines are familiar, and until we read
her critiques they seem obviously-perhaps even tautologically-true. The
protection of property is special-the protection of property is "the key-
stone right"-because it makes individuals independent and, thus, capable
of self-government. It provides individual security and, in the process, dif-
fuses political power. It creates and protects material wealth and prosper-
ity, necessary preconditions for social civility, social stability, and the
maintenance of democratic governance.7
* Professor, Duke University School of Law.
1 Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329 (1996).
2 Id. at 333.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also Rose,
supra note 1, at 331-32.
4 See Rose, supra note 1, at 330-33.
5 Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionali.n, 14 CARDwozo L. Rnv. 907, 907 (1993).
6 IR at 908.
7 See Rose, supra note 1 passim.
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Professor Rose questions whether any of these arguments truly estab-
lishes the right to property as "not simply important but rather the most
important right in a liberal constitutional order."8 Upon examination, many
of these arguments are found to contain internal, logical flaws.9 In addi-
tion, the claim that property has primacy because it is foundational, or the
"guardian of every other right," fails to explain other constitutional phe-
nomena, such as our apparent need to independently insulate (by constitu-
tional guarantee) other important individual rights from majoritarian
trampling.10 If the security of property accomplishes so much-if it creates
wealth, diffuses political power, and so on-why, after property is secured,
don't we trust the majoritarian political process to determine the rest?
In the end, Professor Rose concludes that property may have special
importance, but in a way not usually argued. Property's specialness may lie
in its value as an educative institution. What it takes to maintain a property
regime-qualities of cooperation, attentiveness to others, responsibility,
and self-reliance-is also what it takes to maintain self-government."
Professor Rose's insight is intriguing. We rarely recognize the human
qualities involved in maintaining property regimes, let alone their influ-
ence on other social or political behavior. The idea that the importance of
property rights in our constitutional scheme may be rooted in the educa-
tive function of property regimes is an interesting and novel proposition.
In this essay, I shall agree that the protection of property is a special
right. I shall disagree, however, with the conventional conclusion that be-
cause of its special nature, property is entitled to particularly rigorous pro-
tection. 12 Rather, I shall argue that although the common idea of property
may, by its nature, be the most absolute of rights, the institution of property
must, by its nature, be the most compromised. The special characteristics
of property, which I shall identify, demand this result. They demand that
property protection be given a far more complex-and contingent-inter-
pretation than other constitutionally protected rights.
II. THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL IDEA OF PROPERTY
Property has been described as a "man-made institution which creates
and maintains certain relations" among people.' 3 It is our conclusion
that-to some extent and under particular circumstances-an individual
or group has a morally, legally, or otherwise grounded claim to protection
from the claims or predations of others.
8 Id. at 362.
9 Id. at 333-61.
10 Id. at 362.
11 Id. at 363-65.
12 Although Professor Rose does not directly address the question of protection, her view of
property regimes as involving cooperation, responsibility, and attentiveness to others seems to be
likewise clearly inconsistent with the conventional view of property rights as involving particularly
justified claims of individual protection. See id. at 365. See also Carol M. Rose, Environmental Les-
sons, 27 Lo'. LA L. REv. 1023, 1042-43 (1994) (arguing that individual claims to property protec-
tion must be evaluated in a broader social, even aesthetic, context).
13 C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY. MAINSTREAM AND CRicIAL Posi-
TIONS 1, 1 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978).
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The fact that property involves protection does not, of course, deter-
mine what the particular nature of that protection will be. Any conception
of property must involve choices of: the theoretical basis for the particular
rights that are called "property"; the space, or conceptual area of field, to
which those rights are applied; the degree of protection that those rights,
relative to others, are afforded; and whether those rights, once deter-
mined, are fixed or changing in time. 14 We can, for instance, construct an
understanding of property that involves absolute rights to devise or ex-
clude, which may be applied to land, protected equally, and unchanging in
time; or an understanding that involves contingent rights15 to transfer or
use, which may be applied to land, protected unequally, and changing in
time. The kind of protection that property affords will be the direct result
of our answers to these questions.
The common idea of property is simple: "property" describes what we
have, and that it cannot be forcibly taken from us. 16 It describes all of our
possessions and entitlements-rightfully held, at this moment-and our
fight to shield them from predation. It is essentially concerned with our
security against others. It is rooted in the "primitive, instinctive cries... in
the playgroup or playground: 'That's not yours; its mine."" 7
When we move from the play group to the constitutional setting, there
is little change in the common idea of property that undergirds our claims.
The security provided in this context is that of "legally justified possession
and ... expectation."' 8 Based upon the (perhaps too familiar) image of
Lockean entitlements,' 9 the constitutional protection of property is seen as
a classic example of a "negative"20 or "first-generation"2' right: it is our
14 See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, IX CANADIAN J.L. &
Juis. 161, 169-91 (1996) (describing the dimensions of "theory," "space," "stringency," and
"time" necessary for any conception.of property rights).
15 For examples of property theories that incorporate ideas of contingent or contextualized
rights, see Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, 47 (pt. 2) CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 157, 208-09 (1994);
Rose, supra note 1, at 342-43; Joseph William Singer, jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder
Debate, 43 U. TORONTO LJ. 475, 486-87 (1993); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100
YALE LJ. 127, 133-42 (1990).
16 See, e.g., BRUCE A. AcKERmAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSrrrTiON 97-103 (1977)
(describing the layperson's "ordinary understanding" of property).
17 Gray, supra note 15, at 159.
18 Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IowA L.
REv. 1319, 1327 (1987) (discussing the common constitutional idea of property).
19 SeeJohn Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 193, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Pe-
ter Laslett ed., 1988) (3d ed. 1698) (property as that which "without a man's own con-
sent.., cannot be taken from him."). Elsewhere, I have argued that Locke's understanding of
property was in fact much more comprehensive than generally believed: it encompassed a broad
range of individual rights, liberties, powers, and immunities, exercised within a collective context
of support and restraint. See Underkuffler, supra note 15, at 138-41.
20 The common division of rights into "positive" rights (those that require state action) and
'negative" rights (those that protect individuals from state action) is generally traced to Isaiah
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969) (discussing positive and
negative liberty).
21 The categorization of constitutional rights into "first-generation rights" (those that refer to
traditional liberal civil and political rights), "second-generation rights" (those that refer to social,
cultural, and economic rights), and "third-generation rights" (those that refer to rights such as
self-determination, peace, development, and a protected environment) seems to be a part of
common parlance in just about all of the world's constitutional systems, other than the United
States. See Bertus de Villiers, Social and Economic Rights, in RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
NEW SouTH AFRIcAN LEGAL ORDER 599, 603 (Dawid van Wyk et. al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter
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individual protection against the claims of others, in particular, others oper-
ating under the mantle of collective power. Property represents and pro-
tects the individual's autonomous sphere, asserted against the state.22 It
protects what is ours-our possessions, even our liberty-from majoritarian
tyranny. As a South African scholar has written, "The US Constitution is a
classic example of a property clause cast in... [the liberal] mould, provid-
ing constitutional protection . . . [with] life, liberty and property as the
parameters of personal freedom and individuality."23
The depth of our commitment to this idea of property is perhaps most
evident when we attempt to convince others of its wisdom. In an article
addressed to Eastern European post-communism constitution drafters, Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein describes the kind of "[t]irin constitutional protection
of property rights" that "provide [s] the preconditions for self-governance"
and "serves a number of functions indispensable to economic develop-
ment. '24 "A high degree of stability is necessary to allow people to plan
their affairs, to reduce the effects of factional or interest group power in
government, to promote investment, and to prevent the political process
from breaking down by attempting to resolve enormous, emotionally laden
issues about who is entitled to what."25 As Professor Sunstein explains:
Without constitutional protection of property rights, there will be contin-
uous pressure to adjust distributions of property on an ad hoc basis.
When a group of people acquires a good deal of money, it will be tempt-
ing to tax them heavily. When another group verges on bankruptcy,
there will be a temptation to subsidize them. After the fact, these steps
may seem fair or even necessary; but if everyone knows that government
might respond in this way, there will be a powerful deterrent to the devel-
opment of a market economy. No citizen-and no international or do-
mestic investor-can be secure of his immunity from the state.
... If property rights are insecure-if they are subject to continuous
governmental examination-the system will approach equivalence to one
in which there are no such rights at all. 2 6
Furthermore, we can understand what this vision is by establishing
what it is not. To create appropriate protection, constitution-makers must
avoid "setting out very general social aspirations, or ... imposing positive
duties on government"-common features of the constitutions of prior
communist regimes.2 7 Aspirations and positive rights are "vaguely defined,
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM]; LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH
ArRiCA'S TRANSrrIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 24 (1994).
22 See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 14, at 173-75; see also Rose, supra note 1, at 365 (dis-
cussing the "heroic autonomy" of the common rhetoric of property).
23 AJ. van der Walt, Property Rights, Land Rights, and Environmental Rights, in RIGHTS AND CON-
STITUTIONALISM, supra note 21, at 455, 461. For a discussion of this constitutional idea of property
protection in the American judicial opinions and legal scholarship, see Underkuffler-Freund,
supra note 14 passim.
24 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 907-08, 909.
25 I at 916.
26 Id at 917-18.
27 Id at 919. This includes the typical trappings of a social welfare state, such as "guarantees
[of] equitable remuneration, leisure time, social security, and occupational safety and health."
Id.
[Vol. 71:5
PROPERTY: A SPECIAL RIGHT
simultaneously involve the interests of numerous people, and depend for
their existence on the active management of government institutions."2 8
Because of their uncertain and largely unenforceable nature, the inclusion
of aspirations and duties "tends to weaken the understanding that the doc-
ument creates protected rights, with real meaning, against the state."29
Such "unenforceable rights will in turn tend to destroy the negative
rights-freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so forth-that might
otherwise be genuine ones."30 They will also muddle the lines between
private and public spheres. A constitution, with its prohibitions upon gov-
ernmental (not private) action, is intended to emphasize and entrench the
foundational principle that private actions must be distinguished from, and
protected from, public ones.3'
The idea that the American constitutional scheme involves the protec-
tion of negative rights alone has been echoed by many others. Judge Rich-
ard Posner, for instance, has argued that the American Constitution "is a
charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote the
Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for
the people but that it might do too much to them."3 2
This picture of our constitutional scheme might seem to be a bit of an
overly simplified or caricatured one. We can dispute it around the edges:
constitutional rights, including property rights, are rarely as protected in
practice as they are in theory,33 and even purely negative, "private" rights
require state action for enforcement.34 Furthermore, as Professor Sunstein
readily acknowledges, a system of liberal constitutional rights should be
"accompanied by other [presumably legislative] social strategies,"3 5 and in
the West, where regimes of negative rights are well entrenched, "more em-
phasis on duties [might well] be a good idea." 6
There is little doubt, however, but that this portrayal of the core of the
American constitutional idea of rights-and its protection of property-is
28 Md.
29 Id. at 921.
30 Id. at 919-20.
31 Id. at 921-22.
32 Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203-24 (7th Cir. 1983). Proposals to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment "to guarantee the provision of basic services such as education, poor
relief, and... police protection" would "turn the clause on its head. It would change it from a
protection against coercion by state government to a command that the state use its taxing power
to coerce some of its citizens to provide services to others." Id.
33 See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 14, at 182-90 (discussing the "operative" model of
property used in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
34 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 918-19 ("It is, of course, misleading to think of these as
genuinely negative rights. They depend for their existence on governmental institutions willing
to recognize, create, and protect them.").
35 Id. at 917. Such protections should, however, "be created at the level of ordinary legisla-
tion, and subject to democratic discussion, rather than placed in the foundational document." Id.
at 920.
Properly understood, the defense of property rights is a defense of programs of redistri-
bution as well. These programs are not designed to produce economic equality-a truly
disastrous goal-but instead to bring about at least rough equality of opportunity and,
even more important, freedom from desperate conditions, or from circumstances that
impede basic human functioning.
Id. at 917 (footnote omitted).
36 Id. at 921; see also id. at 920.
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a true one. Although we might agree that, in practice, previous entitle-
ments must occasionally yield to the public good, or what we believed to be
entitlements are (after examination) in fact not so, the idea of property as
a right, as a bulwark, protecting our entitlements, is deeply rooted in the
American soul. By protecting property rights, we believe that we can pro-
tect free enterprise, political liberty, and the general right to freedom from
tyrannical state power.
III. PROPERTY. A SPECIAL RIGHT
Property, then, seems much like other individual, "negative" constitu-
tional rights. It defines certain individual interests, deemed necessary for
individual security, and protects them from the threat of state coercive
power. In this identity and function it is no different from freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, due process of law, or other rights.
Property is, of course, both idea and institution: it is both the general
idea or concept of property protection, and the separate question of pro-
tection afforded to particular persons and their objects of property.3 7
When we speak of the "constitutional protection of property," we tend to
slur these together. We tend to assume that "property protection," in the
constitutional sense, means the idea of property protection as reflected in
existing property arrangements.
This dual nature does not, however, distinguish the right to property
protection from other constitutional rights. All rights operate in this way.
All are ideas-how people envision them-and also are how, as political
and social institutions, they are implemented to resolve particular, conflict-
ing claims. Indeed, we might say, a constitution is a pragmatic document:
it deals with real people and real protections. The idea of rights protec-
tion, apart from its institutional aspects, has little significance. It is only the
general or abstract right, as implemented, that has meaning in this context.38
The fact that the idea of property may be compromised, when imple-
mented, does not distinguish property from other rights. Each constitu-
tionally recognized right is comprised of idea and institution; each is
compromised when implemented in particular, institutional form.
However, here we must pause. Is the institution of property, by its fun-
damental nature, the same as the institutions that embody other rights? In
fact, we find that the institution of property is different. Property involves
allocation; with regard to property, the giving to one person necessarily denies or
takes from another. If we award an individual the right to extract minerals,
cut trees, or control land, that same right, and others that it implicates, are
necessarily denied to others. Property rights are allocative because they
give to some what cannot be given to all: they allocate rights to particular
individuals in finite, non-sharable resources.
Indeed, in this characteristic property rights are very different from
other rights. When we speak of freedom of conscience, freedom of speech,
37 See Macpherson, supra note 13, at 1; Laura S. Underkuffler, The Perfidy of Property, 70 TEx.
L. REv. 293, 308 (1991).
38 Cf JOSEPH RAZ, THE MoRALrry OF FREEDOM 170 (1986) (discussing general rights and par-
ticular instantiaions of those rights).
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due process of law, and so on, we speak, in a sense, of constitutional "public
goods."3 9 There is no additional cost necessarily entailed, to society or to
other individuals, if another person believes freely, or speaks freely, or is
afforded the protection of the laws. The extension and protection of these
rights is, indeed, very "cheap" in societal terms:40 upon granting one per-
son the right to speak, there is no necessary taking of that same right from
another.41
The protection of property, however, is (in the main) quite different.
It deals with goods of a reverse, or "private" kind. If the enjoyment of a
particular good by one person is protected, then the enjoyment of that
same good by others is denied. The extension of property protection to
one person necessarily and inevitably denies the same right to others.42 The
constitutional right to property is different-it is special-not because it is
necessarily more fundamental to political liberty, democratic governance,
or other goals, but because it is, by its very nature, the only right that allo-
cates finite, private goods to some and-at the same time-necessarily de-
nies those goods to others.
Property rights are also special because they alone deal with rights
that-at their most basic level-are necessary for the survival of life itself.
Much has been written about what seems to be the deep, primeval need of
living beings to appropriate. 43 As one psychologist has observed, even ani-
mals recognize possessory claims, and in human beings such ideas must be
considered an innate tendency. 44 This deep impulse is undoubtedly
rooted in an undeniable, biological fact: without some minimal appropria-
39 See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 11 (1989) (a public good has two salient charac-
teristics: first, if the good is consumed by one person, this does not detract from the benefits
enjoyed by others; and second, no one can easily be precluded from enjoying the good, once it
has been produced). See alsoJoseph Raz, Rights and Individual Well-Being, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALrrY OF LAW AND POLITICS 29, 37 (1994) (public goods are those
"which ... serve the interest of the people generally in a conflict-free, non-exclusive, and non-
excludable way.").
40 One could argue that the addition of rights-holders always involves some additional cost,
in the form of additional societal resources necessary for additional protection. In this limited
sense, of course, all rights recognized by law are "positive" rights which impose burdens upon
others for their protection. See supra text accompanying note 34.
41 There may, of course, be situations in which the exercise of the right to speak by one
person will infringe another person's claimed right to silence, or to live in a particular kind of
supportive community-rights sometimes claimed to be part of free speech rights. See, e.g., Alon
Harel, The Boundaries ofJustfiable Tolerance: A Liberal Perspective, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIR-
TUE passim (David Heyd ed., 1996) (discussing situations in which intolerance of the speech or
actions of others is considered by a rights-holder to be a necessary and justified part of the exer-
cise and preservation of her free speech rights). Such "environmental" claims have, however,
rarely been accorded constitutional recognition. In addition, even though the right to free
speech might be envisioned, under some circumstances, to include such claims, there is no neces-
sary and inevitable correlation between the granting of rights to free speech to some and the in-
fringement of the same rights of others.
42 Cf Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAzv. L. REv. 1089, 1105-10 (1972) (when "property rules" are ap-
plied to claims of conflicting entitlements, one claim is entirely vindicated, and the other claim is
entirely denied). This preclusive nature of property rules "lies at the core of the notions of
'ownership' and 'property.'" Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:
An Economic Analysis. 109 HAzv. L. REv. 713, 716 (1996).
43 See Gray, supra note 15, at 157-59, 158 n.2 (citing studies).
44 lon Litwinski, Is There an Instinct of Possession?, 33 Bnrr.J. PSYCHOL. 28, 36 (1942). Litwin-
ski cites the following observations by James Baldwin:
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tion-without some minimal taking of the resources necessary to sustain
life-we will die.
In our society of relative affluence, this connection between possessory
claims and the essential conditions for survival may well (at least for the
majority) be forgotten. But in the many societies where millions struggle
for survival on a daily basis, it is not. Any scheme for the super-majoritarian
protection of the appropriations by some persons means, correspondingly,
the denial of the appropriation of the same goods, resources, and essentials
of life by others. In its struggle to interpret the fundamental guarantees of
the Indian Constitution, the Indian Supreme Court stated that "[w] e think
that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all
that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate
nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head ... ."45 Recognition of rights
to these "bare necessities of life" by some people will, of course, often im-
pinge upon the possessory claims of others; "[but] every act which offends
against or impairs human dignity [will] constitute deprivation pro tanto of
this right to live and it [will] have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair
and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other funda-
mental rights."4 6
Indeed, this "specialness" of property makes it, in a fundamental
sense, far more important than other constitutional rights which we so
cherish. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the assurance of due
process of law-all are of little value if the minimal property, necessary for
life, is denied. The protection of property in this sense renders it of an a
priori nature where human survival and democratic governance are con-
cerned. As a South African commentator has written, "[c] ontemporary ex-
perience makes it clear that 'without at least some modicum of such basic
necessities as food, shelter and clothing, the enjoyment of other rights ap-
pears highly theoretical.' 47 South Africa, as a developing country, "may
find it difficult to convince its millions of squatters and poverty-stricken
people that the protection of civil and political rights is of value to them if
Psychologically, the acquisition impulse (or 'instinct') . . . seems to be very deeply
rooted and to require recognition.... Even among animals we find the recognition of a
'meum and tuum' not only towards other individuals, as for the young of the family, but
also towards things. The bird claims the nest and even the whole tree as his own, and
the dog guards his kennel with his life. In certain cases also, as the squirrel's store of
food, it extends to provision for future needs. Certain birds, as magpies, also appropri-
ate and claim useless objects as their own. In children this impulse develops very early.
It must be counted a native tendency, though ... no doubt it owes much of its strength,
and also the direction its development takes, to social example and precept. Its utility,
from the genetic point of view, is so great... that its survival and evolution would seem
to be simply a great sociological fact.
JAMES MARK BALDWIN, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 860 (1901).
45 Francis Coraie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746, at 753.
46 I.
47 De Villiers, supra note 21, at 604 (quoting Mitchell I. Ginsberg & Leonard Lesser, Current
Developments in Economic and Social Rights: A United States Perspective, 2 HUM. RTS. LJ. 237, 241
(1981)). Cf Rose, supra note 1, at 362-63 (considering the necessity of some security of property,
as the "backstop" for other rights).
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they do not have the material, intellectual, and social ability and circum-
stances to make use of such rights."48
Here, however, we must pause. It seems that from describing a nega-
tive right, or the protection of the individual from collective interference,
we have slipped into describing a positive right, or the claim of the individ-
ual to certain, bare necessities for survival. Although we might dismiss the
latter concem as something really apropos only to developing countries
(and, therefore, not to ours), there is a nagging question whether this "pos-
itive rights" business has something to do with our recognized (constitu-
tional) right to property protection, as well. Can we dismiss this question
so easily? Is this "positive rights connection" just some sort of socialist
mumbo jumbo for developing countries, or is it-inevitably--a part of our
property schemes, as well? Does our constitutional right to property, rec-
ognized and protected, have some kind of intrinsic link to what we collec-
tively deny-the idea of the imposition of positive individual rights or
positive collective duties? Is this another, unwelcome characteristic of the
"special right" of property protection?
The distinction between "negative" or first-generation rights, and "pos-
itive" or second- or third-generation rights, has been challenged by many in
the constitutional context.49 Numerous civil and political rights, tradition-
ally deemed "negative" in nature, require positive state action for their ex-
ercise. The exercise of political rights or rights to due process requires the
creation of a state apparatus, and all negative rights require state expendi-
tures for enforcement. To this limited extent, all rights might be seen as
"positive" in nature.50
The right to property protection, however, involves a far more funda-
mental challenge to our belief that constitutions should not include gen-
eral social aspirations or impose positive duties upon government. The
heart of the objection to the constitutional inclusion of positive rights is the
belief that it is necessary to prevent state encroachment upon the rights of
individuals, but that it is undesirable to require the state by constitutional
fiat (as opposed to later, and changeable, moral or political choice) to ac-
knowledge inequality or to take particular, positive steps toward social or
48 De Villiers, supra note 21, at 621; see also DION A. BASSON, SouTH AFRIcA's INTERIM CONSTI-
TUION at xxvii (1994).
[A] liberal state which is characterised by a representative government which is obliged
to recognise the rights and freedoms of individuals... is merely one important dimen-
sion of the [constitutional state] .... The dignity of every person demands that he or
she shall not merely be free from oppression, but also free from hunger, free from want
and free from fear. [This includes] the right to eat, the right to work, the right to
shelter, the right to health and the right to education.
Id.
49 See, e.g., de Villiers, supra note 21, at 604.
It is theoretically unsound to distinguish between civil and political rights, on the one
hand .... and social and economic rights .... on the other, on the basis that the
former constitute only negative. . . rights, while the latter [require] an active state.
There are numerous rights in the category of civil and political rights that also require
positive state action, such as the right to a fair trial, the right to vote, the right to legal
representation, and so on.
Id. (footnote omitted).
50 See supra text accompanying note 34.
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economic goals.5 1 Indeed, the first goal is antithetical, in nature, to the
second: it is impossible to protect individual rights-in particular, rights to
property holdings-if the state is required, in the same breath, to upset
these holdings through "protection" of social or economic rights.
Although such holdings will (inevitably) be affected by social and eco-
nomic legislation, the ideological primacy of the protection of individual
property must remain clear. Constitutional power must be reserved for the
protection of individuals against collective tyranny. The distinction be-
tween rights that confer individual protection and those that mandate state
intervention must be maintained.5 2
However, this characterization-while it may be true of many liberal
rights-is not true of the right to property protection. If we consider free-
dom of speech, freedom of religion, due process of law, or other such
rights, it is possible to speak of individual protection without state interven-
tion. Because these rights involve public goods,53 which any number of in-
dividuals can enjoy without any necessary additional cost to or deprivation
of others, we can truly speak of the exercise of rights as protected from the
state and existing apart from it. But when we speak of the liberal, "Lock-
ean" character of American constitutional rights-when we speak of them
as "individual protectionist," "negative" or "first-generational" in charac-
ter-we cannot, in truth, include property. For property protection in-
volves private goods5 4 ; it is, in its essence, the resolution of conflicting
claims. If my right to land is upheld, then your claim to that land is denied.
If my right to create pollution, congestion, or erosion is upheld, then your
claim to be free of those ills is denied. The state, by protecting the acquisi-
tive rights of one person, necessarily and affirmatively denies the conflicting
claims and acquisitive goals of others. Because of the inherently intercon-
nected nature of property claims, the state cannot simply be the "watch-
man" for this right. It cannot protect without intervening. Property rights
are, by nature, positive rights, allocative rights.
We find, in short, that property is a different right. It is special in ways
that other liberal constitutional rights are not. It involves, at its most basic
level, the protection of acquisitive rights-to food, clothing, shelter-that
are a priori to all other rights and necessary for life itself. It is, in addition,
inherently allocative and state-interventionist in nature. If one person's "right
to property" is protected, another's claim, to that same property, is denied.
What do these differences mean in a constitutional context? Is there
any special message here for our approach toward constitutional protec-
tion of individual property rights?
IV. THE MEANING OF DIFFERENCE
In her article, Professor Rose examines arguments that attempt to es-
tablish that property rights are the most important rights in a liberal consti-
51 See de Villiers, supra note 21, at 602 (discussing the common "Lockean" constitutional
paradigm).
52 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
53 See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
54 See supra text accompanying note 42.
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tutional order.55 Those arguments carry an obvious corollary: that with
"most important" status comes "most protected" status, as well.5 6 If private
property makes individuals independent and, thus, capable of self-govern-
ment; if it diffuses political power; if it creates material wealth and prosper-
ity, necessary preconditions for social civility, stability, and the maintenance
of democratic govemance5 7; then the strongest protection of those rights,
in our foundational document, would obviously seem to be justified.
We have found, however, that property as a right is not so simple.
Although individual property holdings might serve all, of these functions,
the underlying idea of the constitutional protection of liberal, negative
rights-that the state, as neutral arbiter, must simply be the guardian of
these rights-is not possible for .property. Property, we found, is a special
right. With freedom of speech, freedom of religion, or other such rights,
the state can (by and large) do nothing and all can enjoy. It is not so with
property. The protection of existing entitlements-the giving to some and
the keeping from others-is not a neutral stance. It is a choice-an ex-
plicit, collective choice-of who shall enjoy, and who shall not; of who shall
survive, and who shall not. With other rights, we seek protection of what
we, freely and equally, naturally enjoy; with property, we seek protection of
what we have, to the derogation, exclusion, and often injury of others.
When a right involves goods critical to life-and when the state's actions, of
necessity, allocate those goods to some and keep them from others-this
right must be questioned. This nature of property-this "specialness" of
property-must make it less protected as a right, not more.
If property is to be less protected, how much less protected should it be?
One could, for instance, simply argue that constitutional protection for this
right is wrong. By constitutionalizing rights, we attempt to place them be-
yond the workings of ordinary majoritarian rule. The attempt to place
property rights beyond the reach of ordinary democratic power seems to
contradict the special need to question, and change, property allocations.
It could be argued that property protection-not being, in truth, a nega-
tive right, but rather a positive right of state action-is improperly granted
constitutional protection; that it should not be placed, by deliberate de-
sign, beyond the questionings and revisions of political life and
majoritarian control.
Indeed, some modem governmental charters have omitted the protec-
tion of property from the list of rights entitled to constitutional protec-
tion.58  However, this approach-as correct as it may be in other
countries-seems scarcely possible in ours. Whatever the institution of
property may in fact be, the idea of property is extremely powerful in our
lives. As compromised as the institution of property may be, the idea of
property remains strong and defiant. What is property, if not security?
55 See Rose, supra note 1, at 333.
56 See id. at 362.
57 See id. at 333-61.
58 See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. For a discussion of the reasons for
omission of property from the Canadian Charter, see Alexander Alvaro, Why Property Rights Were
Excluded from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 24 CAN. J. Pot. ScI. 309 (1991).
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What is property, if not protection from "contingencies" thatjustify takings
by others? Property, we find, is the most paradoxical of rights: for just as it
is that which must (as an institutional matter) be most questioned, it is also
that which (as an abstract idea) is most fundamental to personal feelings of
security and control. To remove the protection of property from the list of
foundational constitutional rights is unthinkable to us-its idea, its secur-
ity, is far too deeply rooted.
We must, instead, address what this right, in the constitutional con-
text, should mean. All traditional (liberal) constitutional rights involve the
clash between the absoluteness of their statements, as ideas, and the com-
promises of the institutions which implement them. In this simple charac-
teristic, the right to property protection is certainly not unique. The
protection of property is, however-by virtue of its special characteristics-the
most paradoxical and extreme of these. It is the idea whose absoluteness
we cherish most deeply. It is also the institution which, by reason of the
rights that it involves, must be the most questioned and the least protected.
The specialness of property demands that we adopt a more complex
and, thus, more meaningful approach to the constitutional interpretation
of this right. I suggest two important principles:
1. Property must be explicitly recognized as both idea and institution; and the
role of both idea and institution must be acknowledged in the interpretation of this
right.
Property is both idea and institution; it is both how people envision
it-"that is, what concept[ion] they have of it"59-and how it is imple-
mented, as a political and social institution, to resolve particular conflicts
in society.60 Property, as an American constitutional idea, is a bulwark sur-
rounding the sphere of individual liberty. It is an absolute and inalienable
right, which provides a bedrock of protection. Property, as an institution
is, of course, wholly (and necessarily) different. It is the resolution of con-
flicting claims and conflicting desires for acquisition. In this process, some
will win and others will lose; it is not possible, by property's inherent na-
ture, to protect the claims and security of all.
Explicit recognition of this dual nature of property would accomplish
several important goals. First, the misconception that we are required, by
constitutional fiat, to protect property rights fixed in time and unchanging
thereafter would cease. Although the idea of property as protection would
continue to inform and constrain our consideration of this right, deviation
from this idea in practice would no longer be seen as an "obvious" violation
of "unquestioned" property rights. Rather, it would be seen for what it is:
the inevitable adjustment and compromise of conflicting claims necessary
for the maintenance of the social and political institution of property.
2. Social aspirations and social goals must be seen as inherent parts of the
interpretation of this right.
The interpretation of particular constitutional rights in light of social
aspirations and social goals is a common approach in many of the world's
constitutional systems. In India, for instance, the Supreme Court has devel-
59 Macpherson, supra note 13, at 1.
60 See supra text accompanying note 37.
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oped an interpretative approach which evaluates particular constitutional
rights in light of broader goals of social and political justice, substantive
equality, and human dignity.61 This has been called a "purposive" ap-
proach to constitutional rights.62 In Germany, the Federal Constitutional
Court has repeatedly stated that the fundamental individual rights guaran-
teed by the country's Basic Law (Grundgesetz) establish an "objective order
of values" for the interpretation of rights.63 This "objective value order"
has as its center the "free development of the human personality and its
dignity in the social community."64
Our approach to many constitutional rights is, in fact, quite similar.
We routinely speak, for instance, of the purposes of free speech, the goals
of equal protection, and the justice afforded by due process of law. In so
doing, we recognize that these rights, although "individual" in nature, must
be understood and informed "not only [by] what kind of society [we have]
but also [by] the one which it ought to be."65
The exemption of property rights from this approach is striking.
Although consideration of the "purposes" of free speech is a routine part
of our constitutional lexicon, there is no similar routine discussion of the
"purposes" of property. Indeed, consideration of social aspirations or goals
seems to be distinctly inconsistent with our view of this right. The purpose
of property is protection from the state; how, then, can collective aspirations
or collective goals be a part of the interpretation of this right?
Indeed, it is precisely because we believe in the primacy of the idea of
property protection that we have resisted the practice-common in other
Western constitutional systems-of including social and economic rights in
61 See, e.g., Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360, at 136-67; Francis
Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, A.IR. 1981 S.C. 746, at 752-54. See also Dennis Davis
et al., Democracy and Constitutionalism: The Role of Constitutional Interpretation, in RIGHTs AND CONsT -
TtJrIONALISM, supra note 21, at 1, 48-52, 62-64.
62 Davis et al., supra note 61, at 63. The adoption of this approach has been vigorously advo-
cated for interpretative questions under the new South African Constitution. Commentators
have urged "a purposive approach [under] which the adjudicating court attempts to develop a
theory as to the nature of the fundamental principles contained in a Bill of Rights, which in turn
makes the most sense of the purpose of a Bill of Rights within the context of a society proclaim-
ing democratic aspirations." Id. at 123; see also DU PtL.sss & CORDER, supra note 21, at 62.
63 See 7 BVerfGE 198, 205 (1958). Property rights are, for instance, to be interpreted in a
manner which balances individual and social interests, with the common good as the basic, refer-
ential, and only limiting principle. See BVerfGJuly 14, 1981,JZ 1981, 828, 829; 52 BVerfGE 1, 29
(1979); 25 BVerfGE 112, 118 (1969); see also van der Walt, supra note 23, at 471.
64 7 BVerfGE 198, 205 (1958). The core of German constitutionalism has been described in
the following terms:
The Basic Law ... reflects a conscious ordering of individual freedoms and public inter-
ests. It resounds with the language of human freedom, but a freedom restrained by
certain political values, community norms, and ethical principles. Its image of man is of
a person rooted in and defined by a certain kind of human community. Yet in the
German constitutionalist view the person is also a transcendent being far more impor-
tant than any collectivity. Thus, there is a sense in which the Basic Law is both con-
tractarian and communitarian [in nature].
Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany, 53 S. CAui L. REv. 657, 677 (1980); see also Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism:
A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY LJ. 837, 855-73 (1980).
65 Davis et al., supra note 61, at 3.
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our foundational document.66 The purpose of the Constitution, in the
words ofJustice Rehnquist, is "to protect the people from the State, not to
ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other. '67 Consideration of
collective goals is best left to the political process.68
This conventional view, however, ignores the essential and special na-
ture of this right. Property rights are, by nature, social rights69; they em-
body how we, as a society, have chosen to reward the claims of some people
to finite and critical goods, and to deny the claims to the same goods by
others. Try as we might to separate this right from choice, conflict, and
vexing social questions, it cannot be done. To say that what should be done
cannot be considered, is to say that what we have done and will do must be
unthinking, ignorant, and blind. Why do we reward this claim, and not
that one? What is our purpose in protecting the acquisitive activities of one
person and denying protection for those of another? To deny the rele-
vance of such questions to the interpretation of this right is to treat the
most contextualized right without mention of context, the most conflicted
right without mention of conflict.
Andr6 van der Walt has argued that the new South African Constitu-
tion "should provide basic protection for private property rights within a
theoretical and constitutional framework which incorporates both individ-
ual and social interests." 70 For instance, land "is a special, vital, and limited
resource, the use and exploitation of which have serious social implications
for all."71 "[S] ocial, environmental, physical, and other" factors must shape
the fundamental nature of all constitutionally protected rights.72 The "out-
dated perception of property as an exclusive and unlimited private right"
which the state should not touch must be rejected.73
Property rights are not, in fact, private interests which the state neu-
trally abides. Property rights are collective, enforced, even violent deci-
sions about who shall enjoy the privileges and resources of this society.
Questions about the kind of society that we are, and the kind of society that
we wish to become, must be inherent parts of the interpretation of this
right.
66 These include the right to free primary education (Constitution of Ireland); the right to
work and protection of workers (Constitution of the Netherlands and Constitution of Greece);
the right to health services (Constitution of Greece and Constitution of Portugal); and the right
to protection of the environment (Constitution of Greece). De Villiers, supra note 21, at 613.
67 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
68 Id
69 As Joseph Singer has written:
If 'property is a set of social relations among human beings,' the legal definition of
those relationships confers-or withholds-power over others. The grant of a property
right to one person leaves others vulnerable to the will of the owner. Conversely, the
refusal to grant a property right leaves the claimant vulnerable to the will of others ....
Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1, 41(1991) (quoting Felix S.
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 365 (1954)); see also Michelman, supra
note 18, at 1335 ("[Plrivate power is power no less constituted by public law than is governmental
power itself, specifically, if ironically, the very law that secures private property against
encroachment.").
70 Van der Walt, supra note 23, at 489.
71 Id
72 Id.
73 Id
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V. CONCLUSION
The traditional reasons advanced in support of the constitutional pro-
tection of property rights are familiar. The protection of property, it is
argued, facilitates the accumulation of wealth and the achievement of pros-
perity. Individual citizens, who share in this wealth, achieve material-and
political-security and independence. All of these are, in turn, necessary
preconditions for social civility, social stability, and the maintenance of
democratic governance.
As Professor Rose concludes, all of these arguments about property's
functions are undoubtedly (at least to some extent) true.74 Property is,
indeed, "special" in its performance of these. functions. However, it is spe-
cial in other ways as well. By involving critical, finite, and unshareable re-
sources, property rights are of both individual and collective importance.
Furthermore, they are, by nature, positive rights, allocative rights. The state,
by protecting the property rights of one person, necessarily denies those of
others. The classical liberal model of individual rights-where the state is
"hands off' and all can enjoy-simply does not, and cannot, describe this
right.
The idea of absolute individual property protection and the security
that it brings has pervasive and enduring power in our lives. To deny that
human acquisitive desires exist would be as futile as to deny the dog his
bone. However, this absolute, unyielding idea of property-as vital as it
is-must not solely govern our understanding of this right. We all must
care about who shall eat and who shall not. We all must care about what
our landscape will be. Social needs, goals, and aspirations must be integral
parts of the contours of this special constitutional right. Learning to un-
derstand this truth-by those of us hardened, by rhetoric and belief, into
the rigid mold of liberal rights-is perhaps (to borrow from Professor
Rose) the deepest, educative task of property.
74 See Rose, supra note 1 passim.
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What We Talk About When We Talk About Property
Rights-A Response to Carol Rose's Property as the
Keystone Right?
J. Peter Byrne*
Carol Rose offers an exhilarating survey of persistent arguments for
property being the "keystone right."' She is interested primarily in the his-
toric provenances of the arguments and their affinities with contemporary
concerns about property rights in both recently communist and advanced
capitalist states. Professor Rose does not so much critique each argument
as ponder its attractiveness, giving some objections to each and noting the
surprising twists each argument may take. All this is quite engrossing, and
the reader comes away with an enhanced sense that when we talk about
property rights, we talk about basic questions of political value and consti-
tutional ordering.
But fancy property talk may glitter at such an altitude of rhetorical
abstraction that an anxious reader may long for precise definition and
more plodding elaboration. Professor Rose never specifies what she means
by a property "right." In some places she refers to property as a constitu-
tional right, but elsewhere she seems to focus more generally on how com-
mon law or private law rights support a free market economy and political
liberty. Although the latter proposition hardly seems controversial after
the fall of Soviet communism, Professor Rose illuminates the connections
between private rights and liberty, as well as the paradoxes of the relation-
ship. However, these two issues should not be conflated. While a free mar-
ket economy requires a usable system of private property, it does not
require constitutional property rights exempt from legislative change or
regulation.
In this Response, I want to consider what we should require of an argu-
ment that purports to show that property should be a constitutional right.
First, I distinguish common law property rights from acknowledged consti-
tutional rights, and discuss the treatment of eminent domain under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I also contend here that govern-
ment respect for property constitutes part of the rule of law protected by
the Due Process Clause. I then argue that it is very difficult to establish that
the Constitution also protects against legislative revisions of property rights,
which is the core of the regulatory takings doctrine. My conclusion is that
property rights are not constitutional rights.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank Robin West and Mitt Regan
for comments on a draft and Megan Carr for her research assistance.
1 Carol M. Rose, Prperty as the Keystone Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329 (1996).
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I
Property, of course, means that specific people have rights in specific
resources that the law will protect against claims or interference by other
people. The law sets out the owner's specific rights, their commencement
and extent, and the procedures for conveyance. Moreover, the law will
support and facilitate the property holdings that it recognizes and sanction
those who interfere with them without legal warrant. It is appropriate to
speak of these legal entitlements to resources as rights, because they im-
pose correlative legal duties on all entities under the jurisdiction of the law
that creates the rights, including the government itself. Property rights are
essentially in rem.2 One may generally praise such a system of private prop-
erty both for promoting efficient economic development and for giving
owners a sphere of autonomous management, even as one simultaneously
struggles with external social costs, inequal distribution of wealth, or the
moral ambiguity of acquisitiveness.
But private law property rights do not resemble constitutional rights,
strong rights, that simple legislation may not rework. The essence of a con-
stitutional right in our system is that a statute passed in substantive contra-
vention of such a right is void, or may be declared so by a court. Such a
right guarantees the ability of individuals to take protected action, even
when a majority of their fellow citizens, acting through their legislatures,
believe, even sensibly, that society would be better off if such behavior
would cease. 3 Thus, a state statute outlawing Roman Catholicism would be
declared unconstitutional, regardless of the enacting legislature's sincere
belief that society would be better off without Catholics. The rights of reli-
gious freedom so protected are positive rights, in that they have authorita-
tively been protected by the First Amendment. They may also be natural
rights, in that one may make persuasive arguments that morally a state
must not infringe on religious liberty.
In what sense is it coherent to speak of property as a strong right, one
receiving or deserving constitutional protection, in the same way that we
speak of the free exercise of religion? The Fifth Amendment does require,
and arguments of political theory do support, the proposition that when
the government appropriates private property it must pay the owner just
compensation. Can the just compensation principle provide the basis for a
significant constitutional property right? While the Takings Clause does
embody a property right, the right is both narrow and thin. (It plays
neither an explicit nor significant role in Professor Rose's article.) The
compensation right is narrow because it affords protection against a class of
government actions, expropriations, that are occasional and would be in-
frequent even without the right. It is thin because it does not deny the
government the power to appropriate, but only conditions the exercise of
that power upon the payment of compensation. Other constitutional
rights, of course, unconditionally limit the government's power and
2 See A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE 107, 114 (A.G. Guest ed.,
1961).
3 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1977).
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breaches may be remedied by injunction. Indeed, as others have noticed,
it seems more accurate to say that the owner has not so much a property
right as a compensation right.
It is exceedingly difficult to move persuasively from the compensation
right for expropriations to some broader, coherent property right. One
familiar problem is that property is an institution designed to mediate
claims among competing claimants (usually private) for resources; consti-
tutional rights, by contrast, such as the free exercise of religion, are inten-
tionally designed to mediate between a private party and the State. The
active involvement of the State is necessary to define and enforce property
interests among claimants, while the State need not, and in most instances
may not, mediate conflicts among private entities concerning constitutional
norms. If the Miami Herald refuses to print a story,4 or a Christian sect
splinters, 5 the constitutional norm precludes the State from settling the
dispute; but if a landlord evicts a tenant, or one landowner saws a limb off
his neighbor's tree, the rights and duties of the parties are those estab-
lished by property law and enforceable by the courts. It seems odd to speak
of a "private" realm of property beyond the influence of the State, given
that the State both defines and enforces the parties' rights, but some such
idea must underlie the claim that property is a constitutional right. As dis-
cussed below, proponents of constitutional property rights need to identify
a prepolitical, moral basis for a constitutional property right.6
If property rights are legal means of allocating interests in resources
among private entities, what special requirement does a constitutional
right of property place upon the state? One interesting possibility is that
the State must permit or provide a functioning system of private property.
Such a right to enjoy private property would support many of the values
Professor Rose identifies, such as relative prosperity and enhanced auton-
omy. But it would be hard to find such a general right 'to private property
in the Constitution; unlike other countries' constitutions, such as the Ger-
man Basic Law, ours contains no fundamental commitment to maintaining
private property. Of course, our Constitution assumes an extensive private
realm, and divides government power in order to lessen pressures on pri-
vate interests, but it relies on the political process and popular sentiment to
perpetuate private property. Such reliance has not been in vain: There
probably has not been a time in the twentieth century when American pub-
lic opinion contained a stronger consensus for perpetuation of private
property. In any event, recognition of a constitutional duty on the State to
promote the system of private property could be construed to impose a
duty on the government to support each citizen's opportunity to acquire
property, a proposition perhaps attractive in itself, but not at all what the
proponents of property rights have in mind.
4 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
5 Jones v. Wolf, 448 U.S. 595, 601-04 (1979).
6 Principles of federalism highlight this anomaly in constitutional analysis. The Supreme
Court has stated repeatedly that property rights are not created by the Federal Constitution but
by other positive law, usually state law. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001
(1984). Thus, many regulatory takings cases involve federal constitutional review, under vague
constitutional standards, of state revisions of state property laws.
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In the current property rights debate in the United States, the claim
for a broad constitutional property right involves advocacy of a robust regu-
latory takings doctrine. This judicial gloss on the Takings Clause maintains
that the mere regulation of property use, without appropriation, occupa-
tion, or use by the government, may require compensation. Although the
scope of the protection that this doctrine offers to private property owners
is intensely debated, most commentators accept the propriety of subjecting
some class of property use regulations to constitutional review. An analogy
is drawn between the government appropriating some piece of an owner's
property and reducing its value through new regulation of uses.
But an anomaly quickly surfaces. Regulatory takings occur when land
use regulation reduces the sphere of landowner's rights for the benefit of
other private entities, neighbors or the public generally. Thus, the claim is
that the Constitution restrains the very exercise of defining legal interests
which is essential to the State's creation or maintenance of property rights.
What the owner challenges under the regulatory takings doctrine is not the
character or site of the state's undertaking, but the direction of its conse-
quences. All accept that the State must define property rights, but when
the shape of property interests is revised, even through established means
of lawmaking, those whose interests are reduced may claim compensation.
Thus, it is not private property as a system that the regulatory takings
doctrine protects, but rather the current distribution of benefits.7 For ex-
ample, many states in recent years have made certain reversionary interests,
such as the possibility of reverter, freely alienable, even though they were
inalienable at common law. But if experience with such conveyances led a
modern state legislature to reverse itself and make the possibility of re-
verter again inalienable, the holder of such an interest could make a color-
able regulatory takings claim.8 The analysis is similar when new
environmental regulations prohibit the owner of land from filling wetlands
that she could previously fill: The law that created the owner's right of
possession and use now has been revised to exclude a particular use.9 Both
claims sound in regulatory takings, although whether either would be suc-
cessful would depend on the decision-maker's interpretation of the doc-
trine. Note that neither claim quarrels with the role of the State in
providing the property rule (where else could it come from?), but rather
with the fact that revision causes loss to an individual owner.
The structure of a regulatory takings claim differs significantly from a
true expropriation claim. Under the explicit constitutional prohibition
against uncompensated expropriation, the baseline principle is that the
State, as an entity needing resources, must respect private property just as
private entities must. Because property rights are in rem, they bind all
competitors for resources, including the State. Presumptively, none may
7 The goal of safeguarding the existing distribution of benefits is explicit in the work of the
most thoughtful advocates of regulatory takings. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); see also ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTO-
PtA (1974). But the point has often been lost, sometimes intentionally, in the debate about prop-
erty rights.
8 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
9 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988).
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gain access to an owner's resources without her consent. This baseline an-
tiexpropriation principle seems to be a corollary to the fundamental consti-
tutional idea that the State is under law-that it does not enjoy the
prerogative of extra-legal power-rather than a specifically directed state-
ment concerning property rights alone. The State may not deprive me of
my liberty outside established legal procedures any more than it may pri-
vate individuals.
The Takings Clause also expands the power of the State to appropriate
my property above the baseline: The State may compel an owner to convey
his resource so long as the State pays the owner an amount comparable to
what a private entity would have paid in a consensual sale of the resource.
This special power of government, explicitly confirmed by the Takings
Clause, plainly is justified by the concern that the government's acquisition
of site-specific resources should not be frustrated by familiar barriers to
efficient market exchange, such as the private owner's situational monop-
oly. But the exceptional power to expropriate upon compensation should
not obscure, and might be thought to confirm, the baseline norm that the
government is bound by its property rules,just as private parties are bound.
Perhaps it was some appreciation of this baseline norm that led Arthur
Lee to call property "the guardian of every other right."10 Respect for
property rules is the canary in the pit, the foremost indicia of a State's
willingness to accept that it is bound by law generally. If the State can be
trusted to respect my lawful property rights, it can be trusted to respect my
life and liberty. This, of course, is the central meaning of the Due Process
Clause: The State cannot invade the private interest of any person except
through the pathways of the law. It is my modest suggestion that all Profes-
sor Rose's arguments for property being the "keystone right" (except the
first, to which I will come) are accounted for by placing respect for prop-
erty under the broad umbrella of the rule of law which shelters all private
interests."
But nothing in the baseline principle that the government is bound by
property law supports the regulatory takings doctrine. That government
must respect laws does not forbid the revision of laws. And it is the revision
of laws shrinking the domain of existing property owners that is the central
point of current debate about constitutional property rights. Having clari-
fied the nature of this kind of constitutional property right,- I want to ad-
dress more directly arguments that it does or should exist.
II
This Response is not an appropriate place for extensive argument
about the regulatory takings doctrine. My limited purpose is to suggest the
implausibility of such a constitutional property right being the "keystone
10 Rose, supra note 1, at 332.
11 The evolution ofjudicial understandings of the Due Process Clause, of course, has been
tortuous and controversial. Difficult, too, has been the extrication of Due Process Clause review
of property use restrictions from Takings Clause review. This subject merits further comment
elsewhere. In brief, my understanding is that the Due Process Clause requires that restrictions on
the use of property be duly enacted and reasonably advance legitimate governmental objectives.
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right." In the previous section, I argued that this supposed right does not
protect property as such, but only the benefits conferred by the existing
system of property rules. If my characterization is appropriate, a right
against regulatory takings has little to do with the political benefits of pri-
vate property that Professor Rose describes. However, some theorists have
argued for this right on the first ground that Rose identifies: that rights
against reduction in the scope of property rights precede, and thus bind,
government. Thus, in order to complete my argument that the property
rights Rose celebrates and critiques are not constitutional rights, I will con-
tend that arguments for a prepolitical regulatory takings right are
unpersuasive.
It is understandable why proponents of a constitutional property right
would want to claim that a prepolitical entitlement justifies it. First, the
positive case for the legitimacy of a right against regulatory takings is ex-
tremely weak. The text of the Takings Clause, the history of its adoption,
the first 135 years ofjudicial interpretation, and modern regulatory takings
decisions neither establish coherent doctrine or identify an appealing
moral basis for such a right. I have made this legal argument elsewhere
and will not pursue it here.12
Second, as Professor Rose points out, standard utilitarian arguments
for property rights justify reconfiguration of entitlement whenever net so-
cial benefits can be achieved by doing so. While utilitarian concerns direct
decisionmakers to weigh the costs of transition from one property rule to
another, including the cost of discouraging socially beneficial reliance on
the stability of property rights generally, they do not counsel either against
making beneficial changes or for paying compensation to losers unless do-
ing so retards social welfare. As Bentham insisted, the assessments of when
reform will make a people better off as a whole should be conducted by the
legislature. 13
Proponents will sometimes seek to avoid this conclusion by arguing
that defects in the legislative process require constitutional precommit-
ment to compensation for regulatory losses. There are many weaknesses in
this claim, 14 but one is directly relevant here. If losses from new restric-
tions on property use are presumptively unjust or inefficient because gov-
ernment either is avaricious for aggrandizement or susceptible to the
influence of those who are, then the existing rules of permitted uses, which
also are the product of a fully human lawmaking process, must also be un-
just or inefficient. This is obviously so when the old rule is the product of
legislation, as many property rights are. If existing property rules similarly
are suspect because of systematic bias or influence, there is no reason to
believe that changes in property rules are more likely to harm the public
welfare than perpetuation of the old rules, which may, through mistake or
corruption, favor the present owner.
12 J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 EcoLoG,
L.Q. 89 (1995).
13 See Rose, supra note 1, at 330.
14 See Byrne, supra note 12, at 125-28.
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One response to this problem is to privilege common law rules against
legislation, as in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,15 where the Court
finds thatjudge-made nuisance lawjustifies drastically reducing an owner's
use rights but legislation does not. Similarly, Richard Epstein employs an
idealized common law as the baseline for constitution property rights. 16
But the limitations of judicial lawmaking are so evident, the common law
itself changes so dynamically, and so many bad common law rules have
been amended beneficially by legislation, that a systematic preference for
judge-made law over legislation does not bear scrutiny. Moreover, it ig-
nores the fact, which Professor Rose highlights, that modem private prop-
erty regimes were introduced into most European states by legislation.' 7
Faced with these difficulties, proponents of a constitutional property
right may be driven to argue that property rights precede government in
some binding sense. Professor Rose presents the priority argument as her
first argument for property being the keystone right, relating it to the natu-
ral rights theory of Locke and to modem studies of informal common
property regimes.' She notes that the persuasiveness of the priority argu-
ment, so far as it is an argument about actual experience, is undercut by
the fact that modern property law, from the Allgemeines Landrecht fur die
Preussischen Staaten (1794) to the latest revision of copyright law, has devel-
oped largely by statutes in which conscious policy decisions have been
made. Many of these statutes displaced long-established laws and customs
concerning ownership and trade, and imposed great losses on various seg-
ments of the old order. Professor Rose might have extended her insight to
include the early common law courts of England which displaced custom-
ary and manorial rights with rational rules that confirmed the power of the
crown. Thinkers of all stripes often have confused the established order
with the natural order.
Given, then, that neither arguments of policy nor of historic practice
can establish constitutional use rights, what moral priority should be af-
forded property rights? Natural rights theorists have tried to provide a
moral basis for pre-political property rights that bind the government. Sev-
eral theorists have offered variations of a social contract theory, beginning
with a state of nature in which individuals obtained some moral claim to
possess some resources, found their rights insecure, and instituted govern-
ment for the limited purpose of securing their property. While such a story
may serve useful heuristic purposes, it cannot be taken seriously as a basis
for modem constitutional claims.
First, the arguments fall flat to the extent that they suppose some ac-
tual or virtual social compact through which the State promises not to re-
15 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
16 See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
17 Rose, supra note 1, at 335. It is probably also worth remembering that the United King-
dom thoroughly revised its property law by statute in 1925.
18 In debunking the priority argument, I do not wish to be understood to take issue with
studies of common property management regimes that have grown up outside of the formal legal
order. Such studies may valuably provide insights into the diversity of property arrangements
that may satisfy distinct communities. But the fact that such customs ought to be respected
should not foreclose the state from displacing them in any particular case with different rules,
especially where the custom does not serve the interests of the wider community.
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strict property rights. To the extent that we can identify a real agreement
(such as a constitution), we have no need of a myth of social contract. And
the idea that there ever was universal consent to the institution of private
property at some time or place is fanciful, as has been recognized since the
seventeenth century. 19 Yet without "everyone's agreement.. . rights have
not been alienated in the establishment of private property, but rather ab-
rogated or violated. '20 Tacit consent, as by entering into civil society,
might seem an attractive alternative, as it did to Locke, but runs into daunt-
ing doubts about who may be presumed to have agreed to what. Rawls, for
one, has shown how careful attention to the position of rational people
who do not know what place they will find in society plausibly can produce
a redistributive social contract.21 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine people
agreeing in a state of nature that every owner may use his property in ways
that representative lawmakers rationally believe will injure the community's
welfare. In any event, as Jeremy Waldron points out, arguments of consent
of any sort provide no defense in principle against reformulation of prop-
erty interests "except for the highly contestable claim that, as a matter of
fact, those arrangements were not the ones entered into."22
If attempts to ground property rights in consent are fraught with diffi-
culties, it is harder still to base a natural right on some unilateral act by an
individual. Merely appropriating a thing, of course, does not give one a
right to retain it. Locke offered a famous and complicated solution con-
cering mixing the labor of his own body, which each owns as a matter of
right, with resources already owned in common with others.23 The mean-
ing and merit of this argument have been debated for three hundred years;
however, given its insistence on the right of every person to appropriate
what he needs to survive, and its reliance on tacit consent to translate a
moral into a political right, Locke's solution cannot provide a basis for a
modern constitutional right restricting revision of property interests.
Richard Epstein has sought to avoid the weaknesses of the natural
rights argument, while extracting from it a strong prohibition against regu-
latory takings.2 4 He posits a Hobbesian state of nature with fierce competi-
tion for resources, without any common ownership of resources or any
moral entitlement to subsistence. Rather, he argues by analogy to the com-
mon law first possession principle that resources in nature were unowned
until appropriated by an individual.2 5 He then argues that government was
formed by an explicit agreement among property owners strictly prohibit-
19 Such a fatuous claim to consent is advanced in Lucas, where the Court seeks tojustify the
regulatory takings doctrine on the basis of "the historical compact recorded in the Takings
Clause." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. The Court offers no argument that such a compact actually was
made nor what the terms of any tacit agreement might be, other than the result reached in the
case.
20 JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 151 (1986). Waldron attributes this
point to Robert Filmer, whom Locke sought to answer in propounding his property theory.
21 JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 118-21 (1971).
22 Id. at 153.
23 See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
24 See EPSTEIN, supra note 7.
25 Id. at 11. Epstein's reasoning resembles the court's opinion in the famous first year law
student case of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
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ing the State from shrinking natural property rights, but recognizes that
actual consent can never be shown and that tacit consent leaves open the
terms of the compact.26 Epstein then offers the regulatory takings right as
the solution, because it provides
an explicit and rigorous theory of forced exchanges between the sover-
eign and the individual [so] that whenever any portion of [property] is
taken from him, he must receive from the state (that is, from the persons
who take it) some equivalent or greater benefit as part of the same
transaction. 27
It is difficult to know what to make of this; it has the character of a rabbit
out of a hat. Epstein wants to ground a constitutional property right in the
natural rights tradition, but he rejects its most appealing moral elements.
He seems more concerned with adjusting Hobbes and Locke to the re-
quirements of his constitutional position, than with providing persuasive
reasons for his position. In other words, the account seems result-driven,
and does not seriously attempt to justify the building blocks. For example,
Epstein seems to assert that first possession gives a moral claim to owner-
ship, but does not explain why, beyond invoking the familiar common law
rule. Yet, in an earlier paper, he acknowledged that the first possessor's
right to continue to possess depends upon the consent of others.28 And if
we must look to consent, we may argue about the terms upon which con-
sent might have been reached.
Similarly, Epstein's suggestion that a strict compensation requirement
for government action might replace consent as a ground for constitu-
tional protection lacks legal or philosophical justification. A rule of forced
compensated exchange does not substitute for consent, because it lacks the
legitimizing moral force for a restraint on government power that Locke
saw in limited consent. Although the rule of forced compensated ex-
changes would limit government, why should one accept it as morally re-
quired or even legitimate? Epstein seems to find the moral force of his
theory in its ability to circumvent structural barriers to actual consent (as
damages in a nuisance action are said to substitute for an efficient agree-
ment by landowners to end conflicting land uses). But the mere fact that
the forced compensation rule might provide a rational substitute for an
actual compact (a question I pass by) does not confer on the rule a moral
force that places it above ongoing policy debate. This returns us to the
realm of utilitarian policy analysis, where there is no reason ex ante to pre-
vent ongoing debate about the costs and benefits of changing particular
property rules. At most, Epstein can only propose how we should view
26 Epstein is enthusiastic about Locke's argument that government cannot abrogate pre-ex-
isting property rights because no party to the agreement can convey what he does not own and
no one has the right to abrogate another's property rights. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 12. He even
states that this is one of the "pillars" of his analysis. Id. But this argument is weak, even granting
Locke's premise, because each party to the compact could easily be understood to have con-
sented to abrogation of his own property rights when necessary for the public welfare in ex-
change for the similar promise of every other party.
27 id at 15.
28 Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. Rxv. 1221, 1241 (1979).
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compensation as a matter of policy, not as establishing how we must view
property rights as matters of constitutional law or morality.
Thus we cannot conclude that natural rights theories support a consti-
tutional regulatory takings right. Property rights do not assume a natural
dimension or form that precedes and binds subsequent law. Rather than
viewing property rights as standing against law, they are the creations of the
law, designed to serve social interests in the ways Professor Rose eloquently
recounts. But property rights also, as Professor Rose takes pains to show,
cause problems, some of which may be ameliorated by revision of the rights
themselves. It would be odd if the government were disabled from revising
the contours of property interests to better account for the interests of its
citizens in order to protect established benefits; such a rule would weaken
the property system in the long run. As seems implicit in Professor Rose's
article, property should serve society rather than society serving property.
CONCLUSION
Carol Rose's essay on property as the keystone right characteristically
displays verve and insight. Unfortunately, it harbors a basic ambiguity
about just what a property right is. In this Response, I have tried briefly to
clarify what we mean when we speak about property rights, and to show
how difficult it is to argue persuasively that property is a constitutional right
that binds lawmakers. Respect for property rights by both individuals and
officials reflects the rule of law, and that, indeed, is the guardian of every
other right.
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